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FROM (SOMEONE ELSE’S) COLD, DEAD HANDS: 
DISARMING THE PLCAA WITH THE SALES AND MARKETING 
PREDICATE EXCEPTION POST SOTO v. BUSHMASTER 
Emma Carson* 
“The power of government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks cannot be 
denied. Indeed, considering the nature of the product, that power is better 
described as a duty when we think of the destructive nature of explosives and the 
danger to life and property attendant upon its use.”1 
In October of 2005, the 109th Congress of the United States enacted 15 
U.S.C. § 7901, popularly known as the Protection of Lawful Commerce in 
Arms Act (“PLCAA”).2 The law was aimed at prohibiting “causes of action 
against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or 
ammunition products . . . for harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful 
misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by others when the 
product functioned as designed and intended.”3 Since its enactment, the 
PLCAA has largely “remove[d] the gun industry from the salutary effects of 
the civil justice system,” effectively rendering manufacturers of the most 
inherently dangerous products on the market immune from lawsuits arising 
out of the negligent misuse of their products.4 
In 1998, frustrated by Congress’s inability to enact more effective gun 
control legislation, Dennis Henigan, an attorney for Handgun Control Inc.,5 
roused a series of lawsuits against various handgun manufacturers intended 
to weaponize the financial burdens of litigation as a means of indirectly 
                                                                                                                           
 
* JD Candidate, University of Pittsburgh, 2020. 
1 Ace Fireworks Co. v. City of Tacoma, 455 P.2d 935, 937 (Wash. 1969). 
2 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (2005). 
3 Id. § 7901(b)(1). 
4 THE EDUCATIONAL FUND TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE, Justice Denied: The Case Against Gun 
Industry Immunity, 7 (2013). 
5 Handgun Control Inc. is now known as The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence. 
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regulating the industry.6 That year, New Orleans and Chicago became the 
first of nearly three dozen cities and counties in the U.S. to file suits against 
gun manufacturers and dealers.7 The bases for the lawsuits ranged from 
products liability and public nuisance to negligent marketing and ultra-
hazardous activity.8 
In 1999, after one teacher and twelve students were killed in Littleton, 
Colorado, the litigation campaign gained momentum.9 Dozens of cities, 
several states, and President Bill Clinton’s White House sued and threated to 
sue a number of large firearms manufacturers, accusing them of negligent 
business practices.10 On March 17, 2000, Smith & Wesson reached a 
settlement agreement with the White House to avoid threatened lawsuits in 
what was believed to be a massive victory for gun reform advocates.11 The 
manufacturer agreed to a number of voluntary reforms and committed to 
fundamentally changing the ways guns were manufactured, distributed, and 
sold.12 “The agreement mark[ed] the first big concession by industry to the 
mounting public and political pressure for stronger gun controls” and 
“represent[ed] a crushing defeat for the National Rifle Association.”13 The 
NRA responded to the settlement by publicly denouncing Smith & Wesson 
as a “sellout” acting in “craven self-interest” and encouraged organizations 
to immediately boycott Smith & Wesson products.14 Over the course of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 David Kopel, The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: Facts and Policy, WASH. POST: 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 24, 2016, 7:52 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/05/24/the-protection-of-lawful-commerce-in-arms-act-facts-and-policy/. 
7 Stephen P. Teret & Patti L. Culross, Product-Oriented Approaches to Reducing Youth Gun 
Violence, 12 CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND GUN VIOLENCE 118, 128 (2002). 
8 Id.; Danielle Kurtzleben, Fact Check: Are Gun-Makers ‘Totally Free of Liability for their 
Behavior’?, NPR: IT’S ALL POLITICS (Oct. 6, 2015, 3:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/ 
2015/10/06/446348616/fact-check-are-gun-makers-totally-free-of-liability-for-their-behavior. 





12 Christina Austin, How Gun Maker Smith & Wesson Almost Went Out of Business When it 
Accepted Gun Control, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 21, 2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/smith-and-
wesson-almost-went-out-of-business-trying-to-do-the-right-thing-2013-1. 
13 Selk, supra note 9. 
14 Austin, supra note 12; The Smith & Wesson Sellout, NRA-ILA (Mar. 20, 2000), https://www 
.nraila.org/articles/20000320/the-smith-wesson-sellout. 
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next year, Smith & Wesson sales revenue declined by nearly 40%.15 “More 
than 100 employees—15 percent of the workforce.”16 Ed Shultz stepped 
down as Smith & Wesson’s chief executive.17 Smith & Wesson was 
eventually sold to an American start-up, and President George W. Bush’s 
administration made no attempt to enforce the settlement agreement reached 
between Smith & Wesson and the previous administration.18 But, the NRA 
had made clear the power that it had over the industry. Glock, which had 
briefly considered accepting a similar deal with the federal government, 
quickly changed course after the NRA spoke out against Smith & Wesson.19 
A Glock executive told the Mercury News that the company would rather 
risk “bleeding to death with legal bills,” than face what Smith & Wesson was 
going through.20 Soon, the NRA’s influence in Washington would make 
certain that gun manufacturers would no longer have to make such a choice. 
In 2002, John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo killed seventeen 
people in a span of nine months in a string of attacks now widely known as 
the Beltway sniper shootings.21 It was later discovered that the retailer who 
had sold Muhammad and Malvo the guns they used in the attacks, Bull’s Eye 
Shooter Supply, had failed to keep required records of gun sales and had lost 
over 238 guns in the three years leading up to the shootings.22 “Victims’ 
families sued . . . Bull’s Eye, as well as the gun manufacturer, Bushmaster, 
arguing that the store was responsible for the shootings because of its 
negligent sales practices and Bushmaster was responsible because it 
continued to supply firearms to the store despite the store’s known 
negligence.”23 In 2004, Bull’s Eye and Bushmaster were found liable in a 
$2.5 million settlement.24 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 Austin, supra note 12. 
16 Selk, supra note 9. 
17 Id. 
18 Kopel, supra note 6. 
19 Selk, supra note 9. 
20 Id. 
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The PLCAA was enacted one year later in direct response to the 
“[l]awsuits . . . commenced against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and 
importers of firearms that operate as designed and intended, which seek 
money damages and other relief for the harm caused by the misuse of 
firearms by third parties, including criminals.”25 The PLCAA generally 
shields federally licensed manufacturers, dealers, and sellers of firearms or 
ammunition from any civil action resulting from criminal or unlawful misuse 
of their products.26 The law contains six express exceptions to this 
prohibition,27 one of which permits “action[s] in which a manufacturer or 
seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute 
applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a 
proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought.”28 This exception, 
known as the sales and marketing predicate exception to the PLCAA, served 
as the basis for the 2019 lawsuit in Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms 
International.29 
Larry E. Craig, a Republican senator from Idaho who sponsored the bill 
and who, at the time of its enactment, was a sitting board member for the 
NRA,30 avowed that the PLCAA would “put an end to [the] politically 
motivated lawsuits against the firearms industry” that he labeled “a threat to 
jobs and the economy.”31 The statute itself maintained that the “possibility of 
imposing liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely caused by 
others” was an “abuse of the legal system,” that invited “the disassembly and 
destabilization of other industries and economic sectors lawfully competing 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3). 
26 The law specifically prohibits the bringing of qualified civil liability actions in any Federal or 
State courts. § 7903(5) defines “qualified civil liability actions” as “a civil action or proceeding or an 
administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, 
or trade association, for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, 
restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified 
product by the person or a third party.” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A). Under the statute, a “qualified product” 
means a firearm, any antique firearm, or a component part of a firearm or ammunition, that has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(4). 
27 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(i)–(vi). 
28 15 U.S.C. § 7903(A)(iii). 
29 Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, L.L.C., 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019). 
30 Daniel P. Rosner, In Guns We Entrust: Targeting Negligent Firearms Distribution, 11 DREXEL 
L. REV. 421, 443 n.117 (2018). 
31 VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42871, THE PROTECTION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN 
ARMS ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF LIMITING TORT LIABILITY OF GUN MANUFACTURERS 1 (2012). 
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in the free enterprise system of the United States,” and constituted an 
“unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce of the United 
States.”32 
In the eyes of the 109th Congress, the liability actions that had been 
commenced against gun manufacturers were based on theories without 
foundation in the common law and manifested an intent to expand civil 
liability “in a manner never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, 
by Congress, or by the legislatures of the several states.”33 However, the type 
of immunization enjoyed by gun manufacturers under the PLCAA is, in fact, 
one rarely enjoyed by products manufacturers in the United States.34 Dennis 
Henigan, who fervently opposed enactment of the PLCAA, disputed the 
notion that actions brought against guns manufacturers prior to 2005 
constituted an attempt to unlawfully expand civil liability, noting that it was, 
in fact, the PLCAA that was attempting to radically change the rules by 
“mak[ing] irresponsible gun dealers . . . the only business[es] in America 
exempt from longstanding principles of negligence, nuisance, and product 
liability.”35 According to John Goldberg, a professor at Harvard Law School 
and a specialist in tort law, “Congress has rarely acted to bar the adoption by 
courts of particular theories of liability against a particular class of potential 
defendants.”36 
While supporters of the PLCAA maintain that the law is necessary to 
prevent unwarranted lawsuits that would create major restrictions on 
interstate commerce in firearms and ammunition, including unwanted design 
changes, burdensome sale policies, and a higher cost for consumers,37 civil 
litigation has often been utilized as a tool to indirectly regulate consumer 
products manufacturing industries.38 Actions in products liability have 
provided a vital mechanism for the protection of public health and safety in 
some of the nation’s largest industries and have played a significant role in 
minimizing the outsourced harms of corporations dealing in rapidly 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(6). 
33 Id. § 7901(a)(7). 
34 THE EDUCATIONAL FUND TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 4. 
35 CHU, supra note 31. 
36 Kurtzleben, supra note 8. 
37 The Smith & Wesson Sellout, supra note 14. 
38 Jon S. Vernick et al., Role of Litigation in Preventing Product-related Injuries, 25 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 90, 90 (2003). 
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advancing goods and technology.39 Real or threatened lawsuits in this area 
have widespread regulatory implications for multinational corporations 
“insofar as they discourage manufacturers from engaging in the types of 
conduct that [give] rise to the claims in the first place,”40 and, as such, provide 
an essential apparatus for shifting power back into the hands of consumers. 
In 1944, in his Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. concurrence, Justice Roger 
Traynor implored the courts to recognize the necessity of a strict products 
liability doctrine in light of advancements in commercial manufacturing and 
marketing, writing: 
Even if there is no negligence, [ ] public policy demands that responsibility be 
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health 
inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the 
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of 
others, as the public cannot. . . . The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health 
may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for 
the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the 
public as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the 
marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such 
products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest to 
place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the 
manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, 
is responsible for its reaching the market. . . . Against such a risk there should be 
                                                                                                                           
 
39 See, e.g., John Schwartz, Dow Corning Accepts Implant Settlement Plan, WASH. POST (July 9, 
1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/07/09/dow-corning-accepts-implant-
settlement-plan/8627922a-0b93-49a3-9c98-bfef9e363d5a/ (“Dow Corning Corp. has agreed to pay $3.2 
billion to settle claims of about 170,000 women who say their silicone breast implants made them sick.”); 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 467 (Cal. 1944) (“The consumer no longer has means or 
skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product . . . and his erstwhile vigilance has been 
lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices 
such as trade-marks.”); Wilson Morris, Ford Agrees to Pay $600,000 to Boy in Pinto Crash, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 25, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/08/25/ford-agrees-to-pay-
600000-to-boy-in-pinto-crash/aefab05f-e8a2-4fb6-9bc8-44ed3b344423/ (“At least 59 persons have died 
in Pinto crashes that triggered fires since 1975 . . . and more than 20 lawsuits are pending.”); Barry Meier, 
Cigarette Makers and States Draft a $206 Billion Deal, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 14, 1998), https://www.nytimes 
.com/1998/11/14/us/cigarette-makers-and-states-draft-a-206-billion-deal.html (“The plan . . . would cost 
the tobacco companies $206 billion over 25 years and . . . would eliminate the industry’s most significant 
financial and legal threat: state suits seeking to recover the Medicaid costs of treating people with 
smoking-related illnesses.”). 
40 TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN 
CONTROL & MASS TORTS 2 (2006). 
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general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such 
protection.41 
Since the Court’s formal adoption of strict liability,42 eighteen years 
after Justice Traynor’s Escola concurrence, public perception of the doctrine 
has fluctuated between hostility, apathy, and fervor and has become an 
increasingly politicized area of the law.43 While the law of strict liability itself 
has seen significant changes since the mid-twentieth century, its central 
public policy justifications have remained constant. Since its inception, strict 
liability has generally been understood to provide a mechanism for loss 
shifting based on converging theories of safety, economics, and superior 
knowledge.44 Loss shifting theory operates from the starting proposition that 
“the seller is ordinarily in a better position than the buyer to cover damages” 
because the seller has the ability to raise the price of goods and, in doing so, 
outsource the cost of damages to future consumers of the product.45 Thus, 
“the seller is better able to bear the loss than the innocent consumer and, after 
a period of time, will be able to pass the loss on to consumers in the form of 
higher prices.”46 In theory, substantial settlements and verdicts against 
manufacturers of dangerous products will ultimately drive manufacturers to 
invest in prevention rather than pay the penalty for their neglect.47 Products 
liability suits, then, become a catalyst for redesigns, recalls, implementations 
of new testing methods, differing design strategies, and rebranded marketing 
tactics that aim to avoid the financial burden of consumer injury and 
ultimately results in a safer product reaching the marketplace.48 This model 
of harm prevention through enforcement of accountability ensures that 
“undesirable and harmful behaviors are costly to the actor”49 and provides a 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 Escola, 150 P.2d 440–41. 
42 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
43 PETER H. SCHUCK, TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND 
CONSUMER WELFARE 27 (1991). 
44 See Vernick et al., supra note 38, at 91. 
45 FRANK J. VANDALL, A HISTORY OF CIVIL LITIGATION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 20 (2011). 
46 Id. at 21. 
47 TOM CHRISTOFFEL & STEPHEN P. TERET, PROTECTING THE PUBLIC: LEGAL ISSUES IN INJURY 
PREVENTION 159 (1993). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 160. 
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strong financial incentive for manufacturers to take additional measures to 
ensure the safety of their products.50 
In the decades since its adoption, strict products liability has repeatedly 
proven itself to be an effective means of enhancing public safety and 
reducing products-related injuries on a massive scale. One of the most 
significant examples of this trajectory has taken place in the automobile 
industry. “Prior to the late 1960’s, a generally accepted rule of law was that 
automobile manufacturers were not obligated to make their products 
‘crashworthy.’”51 However, in 1967, after the publication of a law review 
article written by Ralph Nader and Joseph Page that “urged the trial bar to 
exert pressure on the automobile industry through litigation to force the 
safety advances that had not been accomplished by self-regulation,” product 
liability in the automobile industry began to evolve in a way that forced car 
manufacturers to improve the safety of their vehicles.52 In 2012, the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) reported that the 
average vehicle on the road in that year had “an estimated 56% lower fatality 
risk for its occupants than the average vehicle on the road in the late 1950s.”53 
This vehicle safety development, estimated to have saved 27,621 lives in 
2012 alone, was attributed by the NHTSA to “advanced engineering, in-
depth research and analysis of crash data . . . [and] more safety features.”54 
Strict products liability played a similar role in reshaping the tobacco 
industry beginning in the 1990s. In 1987, California Assembly Speaker 
Willie Brown, who from 1976 to 1996 received $635,000 in campaign 
contributions from tobacco manufacturers, reached an agreement with 
tobacco lobbyists and insurance companies to enact tort reform legislation 
that exempted tobacco from strict products liability in California.55 The 
legislation immunized tobacco manufacturers from tort liability in the state 
of California until 1997, after tobacco was removed from the strict liability 
exemption contained in the American Law Institute’s Third Restatement on 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 Vernick et al., supra note 38. 
51 CHRISTOFFEL & TERET, supra note 47, at 161. 
52 Id. 
53 Newer Cars Are Safer Cars, NHTSA, https://www.nhtsa.gov/newer-cars-are-safer-cars (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
54 Id. 
55 Elizabeth Laposata et al., Tobacco Industry Influence on the American Law Institute’s 
Restatements of Torts and Implications for Its Conflict of Interest Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1, 48 (2012). 
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Torts.56 Just one year later, after settlements in smoking-related lawsuits 
brought by four states seeking to recover the Medicaid costs of treating 
people with smoking-related illnesses cost the tobacco industry $40 billion,57 
tobacco manufacturers found themselves facing thirty-eight additional state 
lawsuits and a $516 billion bill in Congress that would give the federal 
government regulatory authority over nicotine.58 
In November 1998, to “eliminate the industry’s most significant 
financial and legal threat,” the nation’s four largest cigarette manufacturers, 
the Attorneys General of forty-six states, five U.S. territories, and the District 
of Columbia reached the largest civil litigation settlement in the history of 
the United States: the Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”).59 The MSA 
required participating manufacturers to make initial, annual, and strategic 
contribution payments totaling $206 billion over twenty-five years.60 In 
addition, the settlement imposed significant prohibitions and restrictions on 
tobacco advertising, marketing and promotional programs or activities, 
prohibited certain practices that sought to hide negative information about 
smoking, created a tobacco prevention foundation, and disbanded tobacco 
industry initiatives.61 The MSA “effectively codif[ied] on a national level 
marketing and advertising concessions made by the industry over the past 
year” in settling the four smoking-related state lawsuits.62 While the 
agreement resolved the thirty-eight state claims still pending against the 
manufacturers, it did not provide immunity from future lawsuits brought on 
behalf of individual smokers or trade unions.63 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 Id. at 45. 






61 The Master Settlement Agreement: An Overview, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW CENTER 5 (Jan. 2019), 
https://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/MSA-Overview-2019.pdf (agreement 
prohibits or restricts: “direct and indirect targeting of youth,” “billboards, transit ads, and other outdoor 
advertising not in direct proximity to a retail establishment that sells tobacco products,” “product 
placements in entertainment media,” branded merchandise, brand name sponsorships, “lobbying against 
particular kinds of tobacco control legislation and administrative rules, agreements to suppress health-
related research,” and “material misrepresentations about health consequences of using tobacco”). 
62 Meier, supra note 57. 
63 Id. 
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Contrary to concerns that such a sweeping regulatory agreement would 
have detrimental effects on the tobacco industry, participating manufacturers 
actually “maintained or improved performance in terms of investor stock 
returns and profit from domestic tobacco sales.”64 While “overall domestic 
consumption of cigarettes decreased, the cigarette price increases more than 
offset such declines.”65 The success of the MSA—and, by extension products 
liability litigation—as a mechanism for ensuring greater public safety is 
evidenced by the continued profitability of tobacco manufacturers post-MSA 
while rates of cigarette consumption have continued to decrease.66 According 
to CDC reports analyzed by the American Lung Association, cigarette 
smoking rates in adults continued their pre-MSA trajectory after the 
agreement, falling from 24.7% in 1997 to 14% in 2017.67 While cigarette 
smoking rates in youths had continued to climb prior to the MSA, reaching 
their peak in 1997 at 36.4%, these rates began to decline significantly in 1999 
and, as of 2017, had dropped as low as 8.8%.68 
There is a significant body of empirical evidence supporting the 
conclusion that product liability litigation has a positive effect on consumer 
safety. In 1976, the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability was 
created to examine the effects of products liability litigation on U.S. 
businesses.69 The Task Force, after surveying large product manufacturers 
via telephone and determining that 51.3% of responding firms had instituted 
programs to reduce the risk of product liability, concluded that the tort system 
and rising product liability premiums had a positive impact on product 
liability loss prevention.70 A 1988 study by the Conference Board concluded 
that firms’ actual liability experiences led to a 35% improvement in the safety 
of particular products and a 47% improvement in product usage and 
warnings, while expected liability costs led to a 19% improvement in product 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 Frank A. Sloan et al., Impacts of the Master Settlement Agreement on the Tobacco Industry, 13 
TOBACCO CONTROL 356, 358–59 (2004). 
65 Id. at 359. 
66 Id. at 360 (“The MSA was never intended nor expected to destroy the tobacco industry.”). 
67 Overall Tobacco Trends, AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, https://www.lung.org/our-initiatives/ 
research/monitoring-trends-in-lung-disease/tobacco-trend-brief/overall-tobacco-trends.html (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2020). 
68 Id. 
69 Vernick et al., supra note 38, at 91. 
70 Id. 
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safety and a 21% improvement in product usage and warnings.71 In 1992, an 
extensive analysis of punitive damages in products liability litigation 
concluded that 82% of defendants ordered to pay punitive damages took 
some safety step to remedy the dangerous situation, with 43% taking 
remedial steps prior to litigation.72 A 1983 study published by the Rand 
Corporation “conclude[d] that, for most companies, liability was the single 
greatest factor influencing product design.”73 
According to Professor Jon Vernick: 
Although it is sometimes difficult to attribute specific changes to specific cases, 
the weight of the anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that litigation has 
made some products safer. Prevention occurs through the imposition of monetary 
damages, media attention, information gathering, and litigation’s ability to foster 
subsequent legislative or regulator change.74 
And while some scholars argue that products liability imposes potentially 
harmful costs to products manufacturers and interferes with industrial 
innovation and competition,75 others maintain that, “[c]ontrary to the dire 
warnings of the tort revisionists, ethical businesses benefit from the awarding 
of tort damages against irresponsible or unscrupulous competitors, foreign or 
domestic.”76 In some circumstances, litigation may even “achieve more 
optimal or at least equally effective public health protection” than traditional 
forms of regulation because concern for the financial and political 
implications of tort liability may lead industries to engage in safer behavior 
that they would not be spurred to engage in by a regulation.77 Additionally, 
some scholars assert that it “is far more likely [for a company] to be 
bankrupted by the loss of public trust in its products than by a sizable punitive 
damages award.”78 Most importantly, the decision of whether the economic 
                                                                                                                           
 
71 SCHUCK, supra note 43, at 114–15. 
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loss, if there will be any, is worth the social benefit of inherently safer 
consumer products should be one that remains vested in the consumer. 
Strict products liability acts as a mechanism for fostering this consumer 
decision making process. Consumers have two central interests in a system 
of consumer protection: that the products and services they receive be safe 
and that they be inexpensive.79 According to tort liability scholar Peter 
Schuck, these interests “coexist in an inevitable tension” and are weighted 
differently by each consumer based on their “valuations of safety” and how 
much safety the can afford.80 The current system of products liability actually 
fosters the free market economic system by supplementing naturally-
occurring market forces and allowing consumer preferences to manifest in 
the marketplace, resulting in a fusion of products and levels of safety that 
reflect consumers’ risk valuation and associated safety benefits.81 Thus, “if 
safer products are desirable, consumers will be willing to pay more for these 
products and companies will produce them.”82 Conversely, if consumers 
determine that the benefit imputed by the product is no longer worth its 
increased cost as a result of the manufacturer’s absorption of unsafe products 
litigation expenses, then the manufacturer and the product will be forced out 
of the market by consumers who have deemed the product to have a net cost, 
rather than benefit, to society. 
Legislation like the PLCAA that immunizes manufacturers from this 
natural free market process, then, are inherently anti-capitalist and serve to 
artificially preserve sectors of industry that consumers would otherwise be 
unwilling to pay for. According to many, the enactment of the PLCAA in 
2005 was historic—marking “the first time that the federal government will 
be stepping in and retroactively depriving injured people of their vested legal 
rights under state law, without providing them any alternative.”83 But while 
it is exceedingly rare for Congress to immunize an entire class of defendants 
from a particular theory of liability through legislation,84 the Bill’s success in 
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the 109th Congress comes as no surprise given the deep pockets and lobbying 
efforts of the National Rifle Association. By constructing and proliferating 
an empirically baseless narrative that the Act was a necessary piece of tort 
reform to push back against “reckless” gun industry lawsuits aimed at 
holding manufacturers and dealers liable for harm “totally beyond their 
control,”85 the NRA effectively bought immunity for the guns manufacturing 
industry in America. 
The PLCAA has had a significant chilling effect on products liability 
litigation against guns manufacturers since its enactment, leading to the 
dismissal of many lawsuits before courts have any opportunity to consider 
liability on the part of gun makers.86 And despite significant criticism from 
lawyers, scholars, and members of the public, legal challenges based on the 
constitutionality of the Act have been unsuccessful.87 As a result, victims of 
gun violence seeking to bring civil action against the manufacturer or dealer 
of the weapon that caused their injury must, in order to avoid dismissal under 
the PLCAA, establish that their claim falls within one of the six exceptions 
to the Act.88 
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In 2019, six years after Adam Lanza shot and killed twenty first graders 
and six staff members at Sandy Hook Elementary School, administrators of 
decedents’ estates and faculty successfully sued Bushmaster, the 
manufacturer of the XM15-E2S semiautomatic rifle used by Lanza, under 
Connecticut state law and the predicate exception to the PLCAA.89 The Soto 
plaintiffs argued that Bushmaster had violated Connecticut’s unfair trade 
practice law (CUTPA) by advertising and marketing the XM15-E2S in an 
unethical, oppressive, immoral, and unscrupulous manner that promoted 
illegal offensive use of the rifle and, as such, could be sued under the 
predicate exception to the PLCAA due to the promotional tactics’ causal 
relationship to all or some of the injuries inflicted during the Sandy Hook 
massacre.90 Justice Richard N. Palmer, writing for the majority, rejected 
Bushmaster’s argument that the term “applicable” contained in the text of the 
predicate exception limited its scope to violations of statutes that are directly, 
expressly, or exclusively applicable to firearms.91 In determining that the 
exception was not so limited, Justice Palmer concluded that “Congress was 
aware, when it enacted [the] PLCAA, that both the FTC Act and state 
analogues such as CUTPA have long been among the primary vehicles for 
litigating claims that sellers of potentially dangerous products such as 
firearms have marketed those products in an unsafe and unscrupulous 
manner,”92 and, thus, could not have intended the reading proposed by the 
defendant. 
The Soto court also noted that many of the legislators who sponsored 
the PLCAA had either expressly stated or clearly implied that “the only 
actions that would be barred by the PLCAA would be ones in which a 
defendant bore absolutely no responsibility or blame for a plaintiff’s 
injuries.”93 In holding that the PLCAA did not bar the plaintiffs’ wrongful 
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marketing claims because CUTPA qualified as a predicate statute under the 
Act’s third exception, the court noted: 
We are confident [ ] that, if there were credible allegations that a firearms seller 
had run explicit advertisements depicting and glorifying school shootings, and 
promoted its products in video games, such as “School Shooting,” that glorify and 
reward such unlawful conduct, and if a troubled young man who watched those 
advertisements and played those games were inspired thereby to commit a terrible 
crime like the ones involved in the Sandy Hook massacre, then even the most 
ardent sponsors of the PLCAA would not have wanted to bar a consumer 
protection lawsuit seeking to hold the supplier accountable for the injuries 
wrought by such unscrupulous marketing practices.94 
The Soto court’s decision made clear that allowing the plaintiffs to 
proceed in their action against Bushmaster under the PLCAA’s predicate 
exception did not do violence to the Act because the alleged violation of 
CUTPA constituted illegal conduct on the part of the defendant and, as such, 
was not an attempt to hold firearms sellers strictly liable for gun violence—
the type of lawsuits the PLCAA was clearly aimed at prohibiting.95 The court 
“interpreted the legislative history as limiting the applicability of the PLCAA 
to blameless defendants . . . [and] concluded that CUTPA violators do not 
constitute blameless defendants and should not fall within the statutory shield 
of the PLCAA.”96 Importantly, the Soto plaintiffs’ theory of liability did not 
sound in tort—and it was likely for this reason alone that the action was 
permitted. But while the PLCAA may remain impenetrable to strict products 
liability claims in tort law, the Soto decision has the potential to provide a 
method of access to the courts for victims of gun violence through a theory 
of wrongfulness based in similar consumer protection laws—those aimed at 
“immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous”97 marketing practices that 
can be shown to bear a causal relationship to instances of gun violence. 
According to law professor John Culhane, the case, which “offers a blueprint 
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for overcoming [the PLCAA]” has “monumental implications not only for 
the surviving families, but potentially the entire gun industry.”98 Because 
every state has consumer protection statutes similar to Connecticut’s 
CUTPA, pursuance of this type of legal framework, if accepted by other state 
supreme courts, “may create a substantial opening in the immunity firearm 
manufacturers enjoy.”99 By holding that the PLCAA does not preclude a state 
from enforcing “regulation[s] of advertising that threatens the public’s 
health, safety, and morals,”100 the Connecticut Supreme Court sent a strong 
message to guns manufacturers: that no one is above the law. 
On November 12, 2019, the United States Supreme Court denied 
defendant Bushmaster’s petition for a writ of certiorari.101 While an order 
denying a petition for a writ of certiorari “is not designed to reflect the 
Court’s views either as to the merits of the case or as to its jurisdiction,”102 
former Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson acknowledged that “lower 
courts do attach importance to denials and to the presence of absence of 
dissent from denials, as judicial opinions and lawyers’ arguments show.”103 
The United States is facing a gun epidemic. Nearly 40,000 people in the 
United States died from gun-related injuries in 2017.104 On August 3, 2019, 
Patrick Crusius entered a Walmart in El Paso, Texas and began shooting. 
Early the next morning, Connor Betts opened fire in an entertainment district 
in Dayton, Ohio.105 Combined, the rampages left thirty-one people dead in a 
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span of twenty-four hours. And the cost of gun violence goes beyond the 
lives lost. In 1994, the medical cost of treating gunshot injuries reached $2.3 
billion.106 By 2019, gun violence was estimated to cost the U.S. $229 billion 
every year.107 Immunity legislation, like the PLCAA, forces taxpayers and 
victims of gun violence to absorb this cost instead of manufacturers and 
dealers who place inherently dangerous weapons into the stream of 
commerce. The Act constituted a rejection of 160 years of products liability 
and “flies in the face of concerns over continuing widespread gun 
violence.”108 Corporations who lobbied for the Act through organizations like 
the NRA have adopted calculated and profit-driven strategies to expand the 
market of their weapons and court “high-risk users” through targeted media 
campaigns and promotional tactics.109 And while the PLCAA has remained 
a seemingly impenetrable barrier to lawsuits based in deeply rooted products 
liability doctrines, Soto may be representative of a growing fracture in the 
legislation’s armor. By adopting the approach taken by the majority in Soto, 
state courts may be able to hold gun manufacturers responsible for the harms 
caused by their products if it can be shown that the manufacturer’s illegal 
marketing strategies were causally related to the injury. In so doing, 
Americans may once again have the ability to decide for themselves whether 
the benefit of the country’s gun industry, as it now stands, is worth its ever-
rising cost. 
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